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Abstract. It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner
Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting
strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Players
are typed based on their recent track record as whether or not they are trusting (Players
1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to
those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy
types. The empirical question we address is whether this adaptation of clustering to bargaining
environments sustains cooperative play analogous to the situation in ﬁnitely repeated PD games.
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1. Introduction
There are two related problems of cooperation in bargaining environments. The ﬁrst problem
is to explain why and how people bargain their way to Pareto eﬃcient, oﬀ-equilibrium path
outcomes. This problem has received considerable attention in the recent literature (Guth, et
al., 1982; BDMc, 1995; Roth, 1995; Fehr and G¨ achter, 2000; McCabe, et al., 2001). The second
problem is to say how cooperation can be sustained once it emerges. The second problem has
received comparably less attention than the ﬁrst.
Even though sustaining cooperation has received less attention in bargaining situations, it has
been a primary focus in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) and public good games (Andreoni and Miller,
1993; Andreoni and Varian, 1999; Axelrod, 1984, 1997; Bohnet and K¨ ubler, 2003; Kreps, et al.,
1982; Ledyard, 1995). Consider the analysis of the ﬁnitely repeated PD game in Axelrod (1984).
In this game, always defecting is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the sense that it does
not pay to cooperate in a population where everyone else always defects. Yet a small band
of conditional cooperators (say, tit-for-tat players) can invade a population of unconditional
defectors provided that the cooperators can cluster. That is, if these cooperators interact more
often with each other than with the defectors (or if the result of two cooperators meeting is
advantageous enough), then the population can be invaded. For clustering to work, though, it
must be the case that the probability of two members of the relevant subpopulation meeting is
not the same as the probability of two arbitrary members of the population at large meeting.
The problem in populations without clustering is that the chance of members from a small band
of conditional cooperators meeting each other is comparatively low.
We want to adapt this idea of population clustering to a simple two-person trust game. The
clustering in our trust game will be a function of recent behavior in this bargaining environment.
An agent’s history of choices gives him a track record. Players can be typed based on their recent
track record as whether or not they are trusting (for Players 1), and whether or not they are
trustworthy (for Players 2). Once the players are typed, they can then be paired according
to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy
types. If some people are inclined to trust, this sort of matching protocol will induce self-
selection clustering within the population. The empirical question that we want to address is












Figure 1. Trust game
analogous to the situation in ﬁnitely repeated PD games. That is, if cooperative play emerges
in the trust game, can the level be maintained via an endogenous matching rule? This paper
studies the eﬀect of an experimental treatment controlling for the history of cooperation by
procedures unknown to the subjects so that cooperation is not sustained by common knowledge
and expectations about the particular clustering mechanism in the population.
In the next section we describe a two-person trust game and our mechanism for clustering
the population. We then discuss the design and procedures used in our experiments (Section 3).
Data analysis follows in Section 4 and concluding remarks are contained in Section 5.
2. Sustaining Trust
In the trust game pictured in Figure 1, Player 1 is asked to choose from the following: (1)
You are given $40, which you can split evenly with another person—Player 2—in which case
the game is over or (2) You present Player 2 with two choices, either Player 2 can take $30 out
of $45, leaving you $15; or she can split $50 evenly between the two of you.
A standard backward induction argument veriﬁes that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) of this game is the (20,20) outcome determined by the pure strategy (R,d): a rational
Player 2 would strictly prefer $30 to $25, and so would choose down (d) at her decision node;
knowing this a rational Player 1, who prefers $20 to $15, would therefore choose Right (R) at
his decision node.4 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
Although the pure strategy proﬁle (R,d) is the unique SPE, it is not an ESS: (R,d) is a
Nash equilibrium but it is not strict, and thus cannot be an ESS (Weibull, 1995, Proposition
5.1). Intuitively, the situation is this. Consider a population in which Players 1 all play R and
Players 2 all play d. Players 2 are susceptible to a certain amount of drift: a mutant Player 2
who would play r were she given the chance has the same ﬁtness as a non-mutant Player 2. So
selection pressures cannot rule out that such mutant Players 2 will thrive equally as well as their
non-mutant peers. Consequently, a mutant Player 1 who plays D instead of R may well meet
a mutant Player 2. If the proportion of mutant Players 2 is high enough, then such a Player 1
will achieve a higher level of ﬁtness than his non-mutant peers, namely a payoﬀ of 20. And so
it cannot be ruled out that the population of (R,d) players will be destabilized due to the drift
of Player 2 and subsequent mutation of Player 1.
This raises the empirical question with which we are concerned. Since (R,d) is not an ESS
we know that it is possible for cooperation to emerge in this environment. What we want to
know is what the behavioral and institutional preconditions are for such cooperation to actually
emerge and be sustained. This is an empirical question. In particular, is the mere possibility
of random drift enough to allow cooperation to emerge and be sustained, or can the level of
cooperation and its stability be encouraged by population clustering?
We implement the idea of clustering by typing players based on their observed moves in the
trust game above, and (in one treatment) match players based on their types. Types come in
the form of a “trust score”, τ
j
n, where j= 1 or 2 for player role, n indicates the round, and
τ ∈ [0,1]. The idea is that each player will have a score which is updated each round and is
essentially the relative frequency of the number of times the player cooperated to the number of
chances the player has had to cooperate. τ is deﬁned algorithmically. At the end of each period,
the algorithm begins by looping through the decisions made by all the Players 1 and calculating
their respective score and then does the same for all the Players 2. A move by Player i is a
defection move just in case it is i’s strategy in the subgame perfect strategy proﬁle. A move
by Player i is a cooperative move just in case it is not a defection move. We assume that both
Player 1 and Player 2 begin with a trust score of zero.SUSTAINING COOPERATION IN TRUST GAMES 5
Algorithm 1 (Player 1 Trust Score). Let c1 (d1) indicate a cooperative (defection) move by
Player 1. Then the trust score of a Player 1 after Round n, τ1
n, is given by the following
algorithm:
(1) If n = 0: τ1
0 = 0







n if d1 in Round n
k+1
n if c1 in Round n







5 if d1 in Round n
k+1
5 if c1 in Round n
That the divisor (when n > 5) is always 5 puts a premium on the last ﬁve interactions
of the players. Pre-theoretically, there is a recency eﬀect of goodwill—recent acts of goodwill
overshadow distant acts of ill-will and vice versa. The trust score algorithm for Player 1 codiﬁes
this intuition by only keeping track of the behavior over the most recent ﬁve rounds.
To compute the trust score of a Player 2 after Round n, we need to ﬁrst compute the number
of times that Player 2 has had an opportunity to make a choice—the idea being that her
trust score should neither be incremented nor decremented in cases where Player 1 chooses his
outside option.1 This will be recorded as Player 2’s opportunity score. We need to make a
similar allowance to codify the recency eﬀect of trust and trustworthiness. Instead of tracking
the behavior of Player 2 (for the purposes of computing her trust score) over the most recent ﬁve
rounds, we need instead track it over the most recent ﬁve rounds in which she had an opportunity
1Why would one adopt a prior that observing Player 1 defect would not aﬀect Player 2’s cooperative propensi-
ties? One might indeed think that a Player 2’s trust score should be decremented in cases where Player 1 chooses
his outside option; the idea being that Player 2’s cooperative propensity, in such cases, gets infected by the obser-
vation of non-cooperative play by Player 1. Whether or not some portion of the population reacts in this way is an
empirical question. But even assuming this view is correct, the result of using our trust score algorithms (which
are not sensitive to this posited behavior) in the matching experiments would be that some Players 2 have an
artiﬁcially high trust score. Thus, when matched according to trust scores, some such Players 2 may be matched
with (real) trusting Players 1. But notice that this would make the observation of sustained cooperative play
rather more diﬃcult to achieve. Hence, if the experimental results indicate such sustained cooperative behavior
even using our scoring algorithms, then those results should be thought of as rather robust.6 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
to make a decision. We simply need to verify if Player 1 moved down (right), in which case
Player 2’s opportunity score is (not) incremented. We will call this queue her omega queue.
Algorithm 2 (Player 2 Opportunity Score, Omega Queue). Let c1 (d1) indicate a cooperative
(defection) move by Player 1, and let c2 (d2) indicate a cooperative (defection) move by Player
2. Then Player 2’s opportunity score in Round n, ρn, is given by the following algorithm:
(1) If n = 0: ρ0 = 0





ρn−1 if d1 in Round n
ρn−1 + 1 if c1 in Round n
Where n ≥ 5, let Ωn−1 be the four most recent rounds prior to Round n in which Player 2 has
had a chance to move.
Player 2’s trust score is very similar to Player 1’s, but the denominator becomes opportunity
score, rather than round.
Algorithm 3 (Player 2 Trust Score). Let c2 (d2) indicate a cooperative (defection) move by
Player 2. Then the trust score of a Player 2 after Round n, τ2
n, is given by the following
algorithm:
(1) If n = 0: τ2
0 = 0
(2) If ρn = ρn−1: τ2
n = τ2
n−1








ρn if d2 in Round n
k+1
ρn if c2 in Round n







ρn if d2 in Round n
k+1
ρn if c2 in Round n







5 if d2 in Round n
k+1
5 if c2 in Round n
So at the end of each round, each player has a trust score, which essentially tracks the relative
frequency of cooperative moves up to that round.SUSTAINING COOPERATION IN TRUST GAMES 7
The two treatments reported below diﬀer according to their matching protocol. In the baseline
condition (the Random treatment) subjects are randomly paired each period. Trust scores in
the Random treatment are tracked, but not used in matching Players 1 and Players 2. The
experimental treatment (the Sorted treatment) pairs subjects according to their trust scores.
The matching protocol for the Sorted treatment is straightforward: At the end of Round n
Players 1 are rank-ordered by their trust scores (high to low). Similarly for Players 2. Then
the matching rule simply pairs the highest ranked Player 1 with the highest ranked Player 2 for
interaction in Round n+1, the next to highest ranked Player 1 with the next to highest ranked
Player 2 for interaction in Round n + 1, and so on.2
3. Experimental Design and Procedures
Our experiments were conducted with undergraduate students from a variety of majors at
The University of Arizona. A total of eight experimental sessions were run: four sessions of
the Sorted treatment and four sessions of the Random treatment.
3 Each experimental session
consisted of 16 subjects.
4
A subject is paid $5 for showing up on time and immediately (and randomly) seated at a
computer terminal in a large room containing 40 terminals. Each terminal is in a separate
cubicle, and the subjects are dispersed so that no subject can see the terminal screen of another.
Each person is randomly assigned a role (Player 1 or 2) and keeps this role for the entirety of the
experiment. The instructions for each experiment do not use words like ‘game’, ‘play’, ‘player’,
‘opponent’, ‘partner, ‘trust’, etc.; rather neutral terms such as ‘decision problem’, ‘decision
maker 1 (DM1)’, ‘DM2’, ‘your counterpart’, etc. are used in order to provide a baseline context.
The interactions in the experiment consist of anonymous pairings in a computerized game. By
using a mouse, each Player 1 can click on the right or down arrows. A player conﬁrms his choice
by clicking on a “Send” button. This move information is then displayed on their counterpart’s
screen. If Player 1 moves down, Player 2 would be prompted to click on the right or down arrow
(again conﬁrming her choice by clicking on a “Send” button). This move information is then
2Ties in trust scores are broken randomly.
3In order to control for some variability we ran all of the sessions at the same time of day, taking two weeks to
complete.
4Two randomized treatments only had 14 subjects due to no shows.8 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
Sorted 4/64/1280∗
Random 4/60/1200
∗a/b/c where a = number of sessions, b = number of subjects, c = number of observations.
Table 1. Experimental Design
displayed on Player 1’s screen. Earnings are shown to both Player 1 and Player 2 after each
period. The game is sequential in structure—i.e. we do not employ the strategy method to elicit
choices. Subjects respond to actual move information when making a decision.
The payoﬀs represent the experimental dollar amounts the subjects could earn with an ex-
change rate of 20 experimental dollars equal to 1 U.S. dollar; both the payoﬀs and the exchange
rate are common information. The games were played sequentially for 20 periods, although the
subjects do not know the total number of periods until the session is complete.
5 At the end of
the experiment, their accumulated earnings were paid to them privately (single-blind protocol).
The experiments lasted on average a little under one hour, from arrival to completion. Subjects’
earnings (not including the show-up fee) average $21.00 (s = 1.8) in the Random treatment and
$23.00 (s = 2.1) in the Sorted treatment. The subjects did not have prior experience with this
environment or others like it. Each subject participated in one and only one such experiment.
See Table 1 for a summary of the experimental design.
The instructions stated the following about matching (see Appendix A for detailed instruc-
tions): “Each period you will be paired with another individual: your counterpart for that period.
You will participate for several periods, being re-paired each period.” We did not reveal the ex-
act assignment rule to any of the subjects because we were concerned that such information
might generate a diﬀerence in strategic behavior.
6 This is especially the case in the Sorted
environment—knowing that cooperators are being matched each period might lead individuals
to alter their type for strategic reasons rather than due to reciprocity type motives.
Anonymously matched subjects in a single play trust game have a strong incentive to choose
dominant strategies and to expect the same of their counterpart. They have no knowledge of
5The subjects did know that they were recruited for a one-hour experiment.
6Gunnthorsdottir, et al. (2001) faced similar considerations when sorting subjects in a public goods game
based on their level of contribution. They also do not tell the subjects the sorting rule.SUSTAINING COOPERATION IN TRUST GAMES 9
the types with which they are paired, yet many subjects exhibit trusting/trustworthy behavior.
Since they make more money than if they play non-cooperatively, they can hardly be said not
to be rational. If such behavior is deeply ingrained in a subset of every sample of subjects, then
the greater experience of reciprocity in repeat interaction the greater should be the use of such
strategies by these subjects. The sorting protocol enables clustering to occur while controlling
for the information that would allow clustering to be the deliberate, constructively rational
choice of those who otherwise would choose non-cooperatively.
4. Results
Table 2 provides the conditional outcome frequencies by blocks of ﬁve trials for the Sorted
and Random conditions. Note that in the ﬁrst trial block (rounds 1–5) roughly half of the play
occurs at the SPE in both treatments and about half of the cooperative ventures by Player 1
are reciprocated. There is not a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between either the amount
of play which reaches the SPE (p = 0.4691) or the amount of play which reaches the eﬃcient
outcome (p = 0.5775).7 By the second trial block, however, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
the mean proportion of outcomes across treatments. This is most pronounced in the last trial
block. When subjects are sorted based on their trust scores there are far fewer pairs ending up
at the SPE; when subjects are sorted, more pairs reach the cooperative outcome than when they
are randomly matched each round. Players 1 reach the SPE 46.88% of the time in the Sorted
treatment as compared to 72.67% in the Random treatment (p = 0.0088). Furthermore, Players
2 who are paired with trusting Players 1 respond in kind in the Sorted treatment 83.53% of the
time compared with 51.22% of the time in the Random treatment (p = 0.0128).8 One question is
how well trusting Players 1 do compared to playing the SPE outcome in both treatments. In the
Sorted treatment, the expected value of trust based on the average frequencies of cooperation
7p-values being reported are from two sample t-tests examining whether or not the means in question are
diﬀerent, unless otherwise noted.
8It was interesting watching the results come in from these experiments. What was easy to observe is that
by Round 10 in the Sorted treatment around half of the Players 1 were playing SPE, so their trust scores began
deteriorating rapidly and about half were playing down, keeping their trust scores near the maximum. Most of the
trusting interactions were met with trustworthiness by their counterpart, keeping more than half of the Players 2
trust scores high as well. This was not the case in the Random treatment.10 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
Trials (20,20) Down (25,25) (15,30)
Sorted
1–5 74
160 = .4625 86
160 = .5375 44
86 = .5116 42
86 = .4884
6–10 80
160 = .50 80
160 = .50 58
80 = .725 22
80 = .2750
11–15 77
160 = .4813 83
160 = .5188 70
83 = .8434 13
83 = .1566
16–20 75
160 = .4688 85
160 = .5313 71




150 = .4867 77
150 = .5133 36
77 = .4675 41
77 = .5325
6–10 94
150 = .6267 56
150 = .3733 24
56 = .4286 32
56 = .5714
11–15 93
150 = .62 57
150 = .38 22
57 = .386 35
57 = .614
16–20 109
150 = .7267 41
150 = .2733 21
41 = .5122 20
41 = .4878
Table 2. Conditional Outcomes by Trial Block
and defection moves by Players 2 is $22.29.
9 In the Random treatment, the expected value
of trust based on the average frequencies of cooperation and defection moves by Players 2 is
$19.49.
10 So in the Sorted treatment, it pays for the Players 1 to be trusting; this is not the case
in the Random treatment.
11
The above is aggregated in trial blocks. The dynamics of play over time reveals the same
trends, albeit more graphically. Figures 2 and 3 show the mean fraction of each type of play over
the 20 rounds for both treatment conditions. The trends are unmistakable: as play proceeds
through the later rounds, cooperation emerges and is sustained among the sorted subjects, but
there is no similar round-eﬀect for the randomly paired subjects.
Along these same lines, it is interesting to look at the average trust score by blocks of ﬁve
rounds (See Table 3). Remember that in both the Random and Sorted treatment a trust score
9EV(trust|sorted) = 0.7288($25) + 0.2712($15) = $22.288.
10EV(trust|random) = 0.4485($25) + 0.5515($15) = $19.485.
11The subjects did not know the end period in the experiment. Hence, one might conclude that the outcomes
observed can be supported by the Folk Theorem. But this, by itself, cannot explain the data for at least two
reasons. First, the Folk Theorem predicts far too many equilibria. Second, and more importantly, it cannot

















































Figure 3. Percent of Players 2 Cooperating Over Time
is calculated for each player based on their decisions, but only the Sorted treatment matches
players according to their score. Since the trust scores track the behavioral data, it is not
surprising that an examination of the scores tells a very similar story to that of the outcome
frequencies. The average trust score over the ﬁrst 10 rounds is statistically the same for the two
treatments (p = .5246 for 1–5 and p = .1331 for 6–10). However, in the last 10 rounds the trust12 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
Trials 1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20
Mean (Sorted) 0.45 0.48 0.50∗ 0.52∗∗
Mean (Random) 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.36
s (Sorted) 0.4030 0.3787 0.4337 0.4406
s (Random) 0.4165 0.3659 0.3531 0.3472
∗ p-value = 0.0008,
∗∗ p-value = .0000.


















Figure 4. Trust Score Landscape: Random
scores are signiﬁcantly higher under the Sorted condition than in the Random (p = .0008 for


















Figure 5. Trust Score Landscape: Sorted
One possible concern about our particular trust scoring algorithm is that given the sequential
nature of the game, Players’ 2 trust scores are slow to increment.
12 If this were the case, then
the algorithm chosen could actually encourage the growth of cooperation by screening out large
numbers of second movers from interacting in the environment. If these second movers are
defectors, then this screening would prevent them from possibly infecting ﬁrst movers who are
cooperative. However, an examination of the data indicates that the ﬁrst chance and the second
12One can think of employing other trust score algorithms where the initial value of trust scores is a neutral
value of
1
2, rather than 0. Such a rule may be more sensitive to what our default expectations about others’
trust and trustworthiness tendencies might actually be. Our algorithms, on the other hand, seem rather to
model the situation in Hobbes’ “state of nature” in which the default expectation is that everyone is maximally
untrusting/untrustworthy. Pre-theoretically, the emergence of sustained cooperative behavior under a sorting
mechanism built on top of trust score algorithms like ours would seem rather unexpected.14 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
Sorted Random
1st 2nd 1st 2nd
Mean 2.34 4.56 2 4
Median 1.5 3 1 3
Mode 1 2 1 3
s 2.91 4.3 1.34 2.04
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for 1st and 2nd Chance to Move for Players 2 by Treatment
chance for a Player 2 to move occurs rather early in the experiment and these chances to move are
not statistically diﬀerent between the two treatments (p = 0.28 and p = 0.26, t-tests assuming
unequal variances). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4 for both matching protocols.
Here we report logit regression results which examine Players 1 trust and Players 2 trustwor-
thiness over time (see Table 5). The data columns for Trust shows the logit coeﬃcient estimates
and t-statistics for the regression of ln
p(t)
1−p(t), t = 1,2,...,20, where p(t) is the probability a
Player 1 is trusting in Round t, and 1 − p(t) is the probability that Player 1 will not be trust-
ing (i.e., moves right). The independent variables are Round, which takes on the values of
1,2,...,20; Treat, a dummy variable with a value of 1 for the Sorted treatment, 0 otherwise;
and Trustt−1, a dummy variable with a value of 1 if Player 1 moved down in the previous round,
0 otherwise. The Round coeﬃcient is negative, small and also not statistically signiﬁcant. The
highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for treatment indicates that the odds of trusting behavior by Players
1 is 40% higher in the Sorted treatment than the Random treatment. The largest eﬀect on the
odds of Player 1 trusting is whether Player 1 trusted last round, Trustt−1, and this coeﬃcient
is highly signiﬁcant.
The data columns for Trustworthy shows the logit coeﬃcient estimates and t-statistics for the
regression of ln
p(t)
1−p(t), t = 1,2,...,20, where p(t) is the probability a Player 2 is trustworthy
in Round t, and 1 − p(t) is the probability that Player 2 is not trustworthy (i.e., moves down).
The independent variables are Round, which takes on the values of 1,2,...,20; Treat, a dummy
variable with a value of 1 for the Sorted treatment, 0 otherwise; and Coopt−1, a dummy variable
with a value of 1 if Player 2 moved right in the previous round, 0 otherwise. The Round coeﬃcientSUSTAINING COOPERATION IN TRUST GAMES 15
Trust Trustworthy
Coeﬀ. t-stat Coeﬀ. t-stat
Constant −1.369 −8.056∗ Constant −2.09 −11.69∗
Round −.0028 −.254 Round −.0016 −.0134
Treat .407 3.138∗ Treat .78 5.26∗
Trustt−1 1.989 15.18∗ Coopt−1 2.09 13.96∗
∗ p-values ≤ 0.001.
Table 5. Trust and Trustworthiness Logits
is negative, small and also not statistically signiﬁcant. The highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for
treatment indicates that the odds of trustworthy behavior by Players 2 is 78% higher in the
Sorted treatment than the Random treatment. The largest eﬀect on the odds of Player 2 being
trustworthy is whether Player 2 was trustworthy last round, Coopt−1, and this coeﬃcient is
highly signiﬁcant.
In every interaction in this environment there is more than merely one’s own monetary costs
and beneﬁts at stake. Each player’s trust score is at stake in every interaction. Also at stake are
the gains from exchange, and in particular we can think of whether or not the players actually
achieve the eﬃcient allocation. These are “social variables” in the sense that they are sensitive
to more than just one’s own payoﬀs and actions. There are two ways for players to incur social
costs. If they defect then their trust scores are decremented; if they are defected upon then they
incur the cost of being trusting when they ought not have been. Similarly, there are two ways
to incur social gain. One is through making a cooperative choice; the other is when a pair of
players actually reach the cooperative outcome. We would like to track how eﬃcient choices are
with respect to these potential social gains. We can introduce an eﬃciency score at round n for
each player i, νi
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Trials 1–5 6–10 11–15 16–20
Mean (Sorted) 0.3624 0.4219 0.4698 0.4838
Mean (Random) 0.3344 0.2981 0.2738 0.2493
Mode (Sorted) 0 0 1 1
Mode (Random) 0 0 0 0
s (Sorted) 0.3802 0.3968 0.4507 0.4501
s (Random) 0.3725 0.3069 0.2911 0.2952
Table 6. Eﬃciency Score, ν, by Condition
Source of Variation SS DF MS
Between 13.1225 1 13.1225
Within 350.19 2478 0.1416
Total about Grand Average 364.0415 2479
Table 7. ANOVA for Eﬃciency Score ν
where d = 0 if Player i did not reach the cooperative outcome in Round n and d = 1 if she did.
This variable tracks how eﬃcient play is with respect to the potential social gains, in the sense
described above, to be had from exchange.
Table 6 displays some descriptive statistics for the eﬃciency score variable under each condi-
tion in ﬁve trial blocks. Figure 6 plots the average eﬃciency score for both treatments at each
round. The eﬃciency scores begin in Round 1 at less than 0.40 for both treatments and remain
similar in magnitude through, roughly, the ﬁrst nine rounds. However, in the later rounds, the
eﬃciency being achieved in each condition is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. In fact, the null hypothesis
that there is no diﬀerence in the average eﬃciency score of the two treatments can be easily
rejected (see Table 7; p = .0000). The level of eﬃciency being achieved is greater when subjects
are being matched according to their trust score.
Is cooperation being “crowded out” in the Random treatment? That is, supposing that the
initial propensity to cooperate among subjects is the same across treatments, then the fact that






















∗a/b where a = number of P1s, b = number of P2s.
Table 8. Distribution of Initial Player Types
fact that behavior tends toward subgame perfect play in the Random treatment would indeed
be evidence that cooperative behavior is reinforced in the Sorted treatment and crowded out
(or undermined) in the Random treatment. To examine this question, we can classify subjects
as either a non-cooperator or cooperator based on their ﬁrst observed move.
13 Players 1 are
a non-cooperating type if in Round 1 they chose (20,20) and a cooperating type if they chose
to play down, passing the game to their counterpart. Similarly, for Players 2. A Player 2 is a
non-cooperating type if when her counterpart ﬁrst played down, she chose the defection outcome
(15,30), and a Player 2 is a cooperating type if she chose the cooperative outcome (25,25) on
13Basing type on only the ﬁrst observed move attempts classiﬁcation of agents according to their innate
tendencies toward cooperation. The ﬁrst observed move by a Player 2 occurs early: on average in the Sorted
treatment after 2.34 rounds (median is 1.5 and mode is 1) and on average after 2 rounds (median is 1 and mode









































Figure 7. Cooperators versus Non-cooperators: Percent of Each Type Reach-
ing the Cooperative Outcome of (25,25) in the Last 10 Rounds
her ﬁrst available move. See Table 8 for the distribution of initial player types, in which rows
indicate initial player types and columns indicate the matching protocol. Note that the initial
distribution of player types is the same across treatments. Once we establish this typing, we can
analyze how play diﬀers among these groups depending on whether they are being sorted by
their trust scores or simply being randomly re-paired. We want to focus on the last 10 rounds
in particular (see Figure 7). Initial cooperators fare much better when they are meeting other
cooperators under the sorting mechanism than when they randomly meet their counterparts—
the last 10 interactions result in an outcome of (25,25) 62% of the time in the Sorted treatment
compared to only 18% of the time in the Random treatment (p = .0000). This is not the case for
initial non-cooperative types. In fact, there is no treatment eﬀect for the defecting types: the
percentage of cooperative outcomes reached in the last 10 rounds is not statistically diﬀerent
between the Random and Sorted treatments (p = .1187). This suggests that cooperation is
crowded out in the Random treatment and fostered in the Sorted treatment.
In summary form, here are the ﬁve central results from this sorting experiment:
Result 1. In the last 10 rounds, the fraction of subjects reaching the SPE is dramatically lower
in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.SUSTAINING COOPERATION IN TRUST GAMES 19
Result 2. In the last 10 rounds, the fraction of subjects reaching the cooperative outcome is
signiﬁcantly higher in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.
Result 3. In the last 10 rounds, the average trust scores are much higher in the Sorted treatment
than in the Random treatment.
Result 4. The average eﬃciency score, i.e. how eﬃcient play is with respect to the potential
social beneﬁt, is higher in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment.
Result 5. In the last 10 rounds, the number of cooperative player types reaching cooperative
outcomes is far greater in the Sorted treatment than in the Random treatment. There is no
treatment eﬀect for non-cooperative types.
5. Conclusions
It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in PD games allows for
some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. Similarly, in the
experimental community there are results which suggest that a similar “clustering” phenomenon
can be induced among subjects in public goods games to sustain high levels of contributions.
Gunnthorsdottir, et al. (2000) match subjects in a standard public goods game based on their
contribution level in the previous round, with the four highest contributors grouped, the next
four highest grouped and so on. The sorting mechanism helps keep contribution levels high over
time among initially cooperative types as compared to a random grouping. The results of the
sorting experiments here suggest a similar story about behavior in simple two-person bargaining
games. Although the SPE in our trust game is not an ESS, we ﬁnd no behavioral evidence
of signiﬁcant cooperative play which can be attributed to random drift and mutation in the
population. This is because in the Random treatment the level of eﬃcient outcomes is low and
initial cooperators seem to be crowded out of the environment. On the other hand, we do ﬁnd
evidence for a behavioral clustering phenomenon in this bargaining game. Sorting subjects by
trust scores accomplishes two tasks. First, it allows cooperative play which is Pareto-superior
to the SPE to emerge. Second, once cooperative play emerges, sorting subjects does not allow
this behavior to be “infected” and compromised by either defecting Players 2 or by untrusting
Players 1.20 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
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Appendix A. Computerized Instructions for the both treatments
Page 1
In this experiment you will participate in a series of two person decision problems. The experi-
ment will last for several periods. Each period you will be paired with another individual: your
counterpart for that period. The joint decisions made by you and your counterpart for that
period will determine how much money you will earn in that period. After each period you will
be re-paired.
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. We will not tell anyone
else your earnings. We ask that you do not discuss your earnings with anyone else.
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question at any time, please raise
your hand and someone will come by to help.
Page 2
Notice that another button, “Back”, has appeared at the bottom of the page. If at any time you
wish to return to a previous page, click “Back”. To continue reading the directions, click “Next”.
Page 3
You will see a diagram similar to this one at the beginning of the experiment. You and another
person will participate in a decision problem like the diagram below. We will refer to this other
person as your counterpart.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
One of you will be DM 1. The other person will be DM 2. Beside the diagram we show whether
you are DM 1 or DM 2. In this example, for now, you are DM 1. Please click “Next” to continue.
Page 4
Notice the boxes with letters in them. These letters will be replaced by numbers representing
Experimental Dollars during the experiment. For 20 Experimental Dollars you will earn 1 U.S.
dollar. The boxes with numbers show the diﬀerent earnings in Experimental Dollars that you
and your counterpart can make. There are two numbers in each box. The number on the top24 KEVIN A. MCCABE, MARY L. RIGDON∗ AND VERNON L. SMITH
(which is indented now) is DM 1’s earnings if this box is reached. The number on the bottom
is DM 2’s earnings.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
You and your counterpart will jointly determine a path through the diagram to an earnings box.
Please click “Next” to continue.
Page 5
A path is deﬁned as sequence of moves through the diagram.
A move is a choice of direction in the diagram.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
The arrows in the diagram show the possible directions of moves that can be made. Notice that
the moves for both DM 1 and DM 2 are always DOWN or RIGHT. When you click on either
arrow, the path is highlighted.
The circles in the diagram with numbers in them indicate who gets to move at that point in the
diagram. Please click “Next” to continue.
Page 6
For example, DM 1 starts the process at the top of the diagram by moving right or down. If
DM 1 moves right the experiment is over. DM 1 earns ‘zig’ and DM 2 earns ‘zog’.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
If DM 1 moves down, it is DM 2’s turn to move. DM 2 can move right or down. If DM 2 moves
right, DM 1 earns ‘wig’ and DM 2 earns ‘wog’. If DM 2 moves down, DM 1 earns ‘xig’ and DM
2 earns ‘xog’.
The decision path that was chosen will be highlighted. Please click “Next” to continue.
Page 7
We will now show you what the decisions look like from the point of view of DM 1. When you
are DM 1 you move ﬁrst. The arrows show you can move right or down. In order to move,
click on the arrow for your choice. DM 2 will only see your decision when you click the “Send”SUSTAINING COOPERATION IN TRUST GAMES 25
button to ﬁnalize your decision. To see how this works, click the RIGHT ARROW now. Be
sure to click “Send” to ﬁnalize your move.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
At this point the moves are over. The path taken is highlighted white and earnings received are
highlighted. Please click ‘Next’ to continue.
Page 8
As another example as DM 1, move DOWN by clicking on the arrow. To conﬁrm your move
click the ”Send” button.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
Once the subject makes the choice, the following appears: Since you moved Down as DM 1, DM
2, seeing your move, now has a decision to make. If DM 2 moves right then you would earn
‘wig’ and DM 2 would earn ’wog’. If DM 2 moves down then you would earn ‘xig’ and DM 2
would earn ‘xog’. Please click Next to continue.
Page 9
We will now show you what decisions look like from DM 2’s point of view. Notice that your
earnings are indented and this is the BOTTOM NUMBER in the boxes. You will only have a
move if DM 1 moves down. Suppose DM 1 has moved down. You have to decide to move right
or down. Please make a choice now by clicking on the arrow of your choice. Then click “Send”
to conﬁrm your move.
SCREEN DIAGRAM
Either the subject moves Right as DM 2 in which case she sees the following: Since you moved
Right as DM 2, DM 1’s earnings are ‘wig’. Your earnings are ‘wog’. Please click “Next” to
continue.
OR the subject moves Down as DM 2 in which case she sees the following: Since you moved
Down as DM 2, DM 1’s earnings are ‘xig’. Your earnings are ‘xog’. Please click “Next” to
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Page 10
IMPORTANT POINTS:
∗ Each period you will be paired with another individual: your counterpart for that period.
∗ You will participate for several periods, being re-paired each period.
∗ If you are DM 1, your counterpart will be DM 2. In this case, you will make a decision
ﬁrst. On the other hand, if you are DM 2, your counterpart will be DM 1. If this is the
case, you will have a decision to make if DM 1 chooses down.
∗ If you are DM 1, your payoﬀ in Experimental Dollars is the top number in the box. If
you are DM 2, your payoﬀ in Experimental Dollars is the bottom number in the box.
You will receive that amount of money if the box is reached. For every 20 Experimental
Dollars you earn, you will receive 1 U.S. Dollar.
This concludes the directions. If you wish to return to them please click the “Back” button. If
you have any questions please raise your hand. Otherwise, to begin the experiment, please click
the green button, “Finished with directions”.